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AUTHOR Starr, Jerold M.
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ABSTRACT

This paper critically reviews sociological literature on youth protest. The major objective is to ascertain whether existing perspectives on youth movements are adequate to explain historical change in modern society. Most sociological research on youth activism is predicated on either a family socialization model or a structural functional model. Evaluation of findings from research based on these models indicated that they are inadequate to define the phenomenon of youth movements in the modern age. Particular reasons for this inadequacy include that the research tends to be either purely descriptive in character or more concerned with assigning blame or recommending social control strategies than with understanding the phenomenon in a larger context. This paper hypothesizes that Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge theory serves as a more valid approach to explaining youth movements because it is the only approach which is consistent with the macro-historical character of generational movements. In Mannheim's approach, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the mentality or spirit of any historical epoch and on the influence of the group on the individual. Because of this influence and because each new generation develops an ideological interpretation which is distinct from that of its elders, Mannheim's approach enables researchers to view youth protest more as an opportunity for young people to achieve greater awareness of themselves, their environment, and their political orientation than as a reaction against exclusion from social participation alongside older citizens. Further, data on the changing base of the youth movement, the spread of the counterculture, and the continuation of radical orientations among activists into adulthood tend to support Mannheim's approach over family socialization or structural functional approaches. (DB)

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THE GENERATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE:

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN MODERN HISTORY

SO 012 959

Jerold M. Starr
West Virginia University

The Generation of Social Change:

New Perspectives on Youth Movements in Modern History

The youth protest movement of the 1960's had a profound impact on the culture of the period, including much social science. Most sociological literature examined youth protest either in terms of a family socialization or structural-functional model. These solutions are analyzed critically and found to be inadequate to the problem. Mannheim's sociology of knowledge approach is explicated and endorsed as the only one which is consistent with the macro-historical character of generational movements. Moreover, data on the changing base of the youth movement, the spread of the counterculture, and the continuation of radical orientations among activists into adulthood tend to support Mannheim's approach over the others. Finally, recent research on generations is cited to indicate the increasing value of this concept for the understanding of historical change in modern society.

Certainly, the American Youth Protest Movement of the 1960's was one of the most conspicuous features of social life throughout that period. In fact, one Gallup Poll, conducted in June of 1970, showed that a large plurality of adult Americans considered campus unrest the major problem facing this country, ahead of the war in Indochina, racial strife, and the high cost of living. Moreover, even a cursory examination of the phenomenon reveals that youth protest movements have been worldwide in scope and have constituted a dynamic force in the process of social change throughout modern history. Surely this should have been a sociological problem worth investigating. And investigated it was. The turbulent events of the period generated a tremendous volume of literature on American student protest, published in every major journal of American social science as well as the popular media. What was so striking about this literature, however, was how much of it was lacking any substantial account of the phenomenon itself.

There were hardly any analyses of the subject in its own terms: as an historically located, age-based movement for social change. The relatively few accounts based on direct observation of real events involving real youth defining situations, making decisions, and taking actions, for the most part, were either purely descriptive in character or more concerned with assigning blame or recommending social control strategies than with understanding the phenomenon in larger context. Absent faculty, unruly students or ineffective administrators (either too hard or too soft, too early or too late) were cast as the typical villains of such scenarios.

However, most studies of youth protest in the 1960's and early 1970's were not based on the analysis of protest events or even on the institutional settings within which such confrontations were most likely to occur. By far,

the most abundant research in the area focused on the family backgrounds of students identified as activists. In addition, structural functional theory continued to enjoy great prestige among many sociologists during this period and was applied to the behavior of adolescents and youth, including protest.

THE FAMILY SOCIALIZATION APPROACH: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The family socialization theory, prominent in the popular media, generally condemned the behavior of student activists as violent, irrational disobedience. The parents of protestors were blamed for either their "moralizing upper-middle-class sensibility" (Adeslon, 1971A), lack of "manliness" or "prestige" (Feuer, 1969), or failure to provide honest feelings, firm authority, and "meaningful guideposts" for their children (Bettelheim, 1969). Such ego, defense mechanisms as repression, regression, reaction-formation, projection, and, especially, displacement were offered as explanation for the dubious link between individual childhood family experiences and collective participation in the youth movement.

Acceptance of the family socialization theory of youth movements required the neglect of numerous previous studies in political socialization which found little or no correlation between parent-child political agreement (or disagreement) and such relevant variables as parent-child conflict or parent-child closeness, even when controlling for salience of political attitudes in the home (see Nogee and Levin, 1958; Middleton and Putney, 1963; Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Eckhardt and Schriner, 1969; and Jaros, Hersch, and Fleron, 1972).

Moreover, most of those few researchers who did uncover such a pattern were willing to acknowledge that correlation is not identical with causation; that youth may have influenced their parents' attitudes or that parent-child political disagreement, especially during a period of intense political

controversy, may be interpretated as the cause rather than effect of parent-child conflict and feelings of mutual estrangement in general (see Middleton and Putney, 1963; Lewis and Kraut, 1972; and Bengtson and Black, 1973).[1]

Obviously overlooked by the family socialization theorists were the developmental theories of Piaget, Kohlberg, and Erikson which indicate that most learning is stage specific and that the capacity and motivation for ideological thought does not emerge until adolescence and youth (see Adelson, 1971B; Lambert, 1972). Empirical investigations of the causes of student activism, indeed, have found that it is most directly affected by current political ideology which, in turn, is most directly affected by more recent adult political socialization. Early familial socialization is shown to have only weak and indirect effects (see Kornberg and Brehm, 1971; Geschwender, Rinehart, and George, 1974; and Fendich and Krauss, 1975).

Emphasis on family socialization as the cause of student activism could be accomplished only by abstracting the family from its structural-historical context. Writers ignored political and economic influences on parents' child-rearing practices and value training, despite abundant research documenting such contextual effects (Inkeles, 1955; Miller and Swanson, 1958; Kohn, 1963; Pearlin and Kohn, 1966; Minturn and Lambert, 1968; Kohn and Schooler, 1969, 1973; Steinmetz, 1972; and Jaros, 1973). Moreover, all parent-child similarites were presumed to represent the effects of parental transmission rather than the common location of both parents and children in the social structure.[2]

Numerous studies have demonstrated that control over economic resources is positively correlated with degree of parental authority (see, for example, Benedict, 1946; Aberle and Naegle, 1952; Blood and Wolfe, 1960; Blood and Hamblin, 1972). The significantly reduced capacity of American parents to provide income producing property, a business, or even a trade for their children

has had the characteristic effect of reducing their influence over them.[3]

Ironically, at least from the point of view of distressed liberal parents, even social reforms designed to reduce inequality in modern America also have had the general effect of reducing parental authority. Reforms such as inheritance tax, civil service, mass public education and civil rights legislation represent attempts to restrict the relevance of family background to individual opportunity. As a result of such reforms, individuals may now claim rights and opportunities regardless of their family's status. Indeed, in modern society people increasingly have come to demand recognition for themselves as individuals rather than as members of their families.

One such social reform which clearly has come to compete with parents for influence over the child has been compulsory mass public education. In fact, the growth of the American educational establishment over the past hundred years or so has been phenomenal. The proportion of youth aged 14 to 17 enrolled in high school has increased from about 11% in 1900, to 73% in 1930, to almost 95% in 1970. The proportion of youth aged 18 to 21 enrolled in college has increased from about 4% in 1900, to about 12% in 1930, to almost half in 1970.[4]

Hess and Torney (1968) have contended that the public school is the most important instrument of political socialization in the United States. According to them, the family transmits its values in relatively few areas of political socialization and, for the most part, is felt only as one of several socializing agencies.

The influence of non-familial agencies of socialization generally on contemporary youth cannot be over-emphasized. The well-known study of college students by Goldsen, Rosenberg, Williams, and Suchman (1960) demonstrated that the many "students who go contrary to the political views of their fathers are finding a way of adjusting their own political views more nearly to the accepted

norm of certain sociological groups to which they feel an allegiance," such as religious groups, college classmates, etc. Some measure of the relative strength of peer group identification may be derived from the fact that, when college students were asked by Yankelovich (1972) with which groups they identified, more students named college students (82%) or people of their generation (64%) than named their own families (61%). All other groups were named by less than half of those surveyed.

Moreover, the complexity of modern society and the importance of major status transitions to individual behavior throughout the life cycle also seems to have been ignored by the emphasis on parental socialization in understanding youth. According to Ryder (1965:852):

> Any model of individual development which postulates early crystallization is embarrassing to the person explaining rapid social change... Socialization is a process of committing an individual to a term of service in a group, by progressively confining his behavior potentialities within an acceptable range and by preparing him for the types of roles he will be expected to play. Far from being monopolized by the parents, socialization is a continuous process throughout life, shared in by every group of which a person may become a member.

Perhaps the principal flaws in the family socialization approach to youth movements were that it was reductionist and ahistorical. The complex, collective behavior which constituted the student protest movement was reduced to the intrapsychic motivations of individual members and the phenomenon was completely abstracted out of time and place. Little or no attempt was made to account for the appearance of protest activity in some places and not others, at some times and not others. There wasn't even much attempt to account for the alleged

historical variations in parental socialization which were proposed as the causative factory in youth protest.[5]

In order to formulate the question of youth protest in a manner compatible with the nature of the family socialization approach, a lineage, rather than cohort, conception of youth had to be advanced. Even Feuer's (1969) attempt to encompass student rebellions around the world over the last 150 years suffers from this reductionist tendency. Although he introduces the concept of cultural-political generations as a sociological category, he frequently discusses the phenomenon in lineage terms (e.g., "the student movement is almost like a secret society of sons and daughters banded against the father").

Unfortunately, the lineage model of generational conflict distorts the complex dynamics of age group relations in the larger society. As Ryder (1965: 852) has pointed out, "the age gap between father and son disappears in the population at large through the comprehensive overlapping of life cycles." In contrast, the concept of age cohort offers a better perspective from which to understand youth movements. An age cohort is defined as a structural category of people born within the same time frame, if not in the same year, which is characterized by a distinctive size and demographic composition as well as a unique historical experience. This concept clearly is superior to that of lineage in comprehending the interaction of life cycle and historical forces as they relate to age based movements for social change.[6]

THE STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONAL APPROACH: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In contradistinction to the family socialization theory, the structural functional approach is sensitive to systemic strains and pressures specific to youth. It focuses on resistences to such age graded tensions rather than on any hypostasized psychological residues from earlier stages of development. Nevertheless, it too is incapable of providing a genuinely historical

understanding of youth protest movements. In order to account for its failure to adequately comprehend events of the sixties, we must turn to a closer examination of its basic principles as outlined by its foremost exponent, Talcott Parsons.

Like the psychoanalytically oriented theorists discussed earlier, Parsons attempts to explain the dramatically different behavior of youth in the sixties in terms of the same general theoretical approach. The current version of this approach is presented in The American University (1973), co-authored with Gerald Platt, and in the essay,"Higher Education and Changing Socialization," also co-authored with Platt, published in Aging and Society (1972), edited by Riley, et. al.

Parsons and Platt propose that structural differentiation in society requires modifications in the socialization process which, in turn, cause certain age groups to experience life cycle "disturbances" until the norms and expectations of the new socialization process have been fully institutionalized.

The Parsons-Platt analysis of what they call the studentry stage (the third stage in their schema) is placed within the context of their discussion of the evolution of the modern university. According to the authors, the modern university embodies the value of cognitive rationality and has become essential to the basic stability and economic development of our "dynamically evolving" society.

Youth who do not go on to college must face "occupational and financial ceilings" because they have failed to develop the "technical and cognitive capacities normally acquired as a result of attending college" (Parsons and Platt, 1972:251). The noncollege population also "remains embedded at less differentiated value levels." The terminal high school student remains more committed to a circumscribed environment, consisting of a limited number of

ascriptive solidarities, like family, religious and patriotic organizations. He is less aware and tolerant of differences.

In order to realize the fruits of their training and certification, however, college students have to submit to the socialization pressures necessary to preparing them for adult status. The mature adult recognizes his "central obligation" "to act responsibly in the interests of the value-based collective system" (Parsons and Platt, 1972:248). In order to do this he must develop self reliance and self control; a need for achievement and the ability to compete; and the capacity both to accept the legitimate (functionally necessary) authority of others and to exercise authority over others.

The demands of early maturity, Parsons and Platt warn, may run counter to the orientations of the student peer group. The adolescent peer community is characterized by an egalitarian solidarity which includes a diffuse common value-orientation and a diffuse emotional attachment of the members to the group and to each other. Among students, moral attitudes are held with "uncompromising commitment." Members tend to be "intensely devoted" to the goals of the group and "passionate" in defending them. Adolescent peer loyalty tends to involve "a total identification with one's own groupand an unrealistic derogation of other groups, in short, ethnocentrism" (1972:250).

Unlike their less fortunate peers, college students have the opportunity to develop increased "flexibility, autonomy, and ego-strength." They can do so to the extent that they are able to escape the total demands of the uncompromising peer group. Parsons and Platt (1972:255) explain that, "From a functional point of view," the developmental task of the period of studentry is to repress the need for "diffuse, affective, undifferentiated solidarity" and restructure it into "new valuations of achievement and responsibility" in which the individual accepts his commitments to a multiplicity of adult groups,

none to the exclusion of the others.

About a decade earlier Parsons (1965) explained the "touchy sensitivity to adult control," "fiercely compulsive conformity" to the peer group, and "strong romantic streak" of youth as reflecting the "duality of orientation" of those eager to learn to take their places in adult society, but chafing under the restrictions of local authorities.

The structural functional approach to youth protest which Parsons introduces after the totally unanticipated ground swell in political activism in the 1960's is newly embroidered but of the same material. The source of the problem remains the time lag in fully institutionalizing an extension in the socialization process (i.e., college or university training) required by our progressively differentiating society.

The student peer group, which in the earlier formulation evolved in order to facilitate the transition to adulthood, is now presented as constituting an obstacle to that transition. The "universalism" and "achievement orientation" of the peer group now is ignored while its "diffuse, affective, undifferentiated solidarity" is emphasized. The radical political-ideological "themes of dissent" chosen by students are interpreted as being merely symbolic of their resistance to the socialization they must experience in order to enter early maturity.

Parsons and Platt acknowledge student radicals to be "for the most part deeply identified with the academic system." They also acknowledge the existence of certain "constructive rather than disruptive symbolic themes inherent in contemporary student movements." Nevertheless, they devote a substantial portion of their essay to cataloguing, refuting, and explaining away the motivations for the "disruptive symbolic themes of student protest." Before Parsons

and Platt have finished, students are accused of exalting irrationality; embracing anarchism; anti-intellectualism; moral absolutism; urge toward militancy, confrontation, and exacerbation of conflict; mixture of impracticality, paranoia, and of idealism; and an incestuous desire to become too firmly a part of the academic system. The form of this analysis, it should be noted, is consistent with Parsons' treatment of social movements generally.[7]

Commenting on a more quietistic period in his earlier essay, Parsons (1965:33) says, the susceptibility of youth groups to radical political ideologies seems to be conspicuous in "societies entering a more 'developed' state, in which intellectuals are especially placed." It also occurs in societies experiencing "major political transitions and instabilities," such as Germany between the wars.

America in the early 1960's appears to Parsons to be a stable, advanced, industrial society which fits neither case. Parsons (1965:121) sees America as "relatively well organized and integrated with reference to its major trends of development." He observes approvingly that American society "in a sense appears to be running a scheduled course" and "ought to be a society in which they [American youth] can look forward to a good life" (1965:122).

Despite signs of minor strain, Parsons remains optimistic about the smooth incorporation of at least middle class youth into the system. He notes a trend toward a relaxation of tension toward parents and a "markedly greater acceptance of the evaluation of good work and its importance for the future." There also is "more moderation in the use of alcohol and more 'seriousness' in the field of sexual relations."

In sum, "youth has become better integrated in the general culture." There is even a greater "development of serious cultural interests among students in the more elite colleges" (1965:131-3). And, of particular interest to our

discussion, is Parsons' statement that American youth seem to be "apathetic politically." Despite an apparently increasing concern for "specific issues in which moral problems are sharply defined" (e.g., race relations and nuclear war), "the main orientation of youth seems to be in tune with the society in which they are learning to take their places" (1965:134).

As we all know, Parsons' serene portrait of American youth was shattered by the events of the latter half of the 1960's. The use of a variety of mood altering substances, much less alcohol, was quite immoderate; sex was regarded with considerably less "seriousness"; the formal evaluation of performance in school came under severe criticism; and radical political ideologies proliferated the nation's campuses.

There was no basis for predicting such events from structural functional theory. This theory would postulate the inherent tendency toward greater integration in societies through the progressive working out of contradictions and inconsistencies; like the status of college youth caught between dependency and responsibility in a society which both requires more technical training and values "incessant activity on behalf of collective interests."

Similarly, Goertzel (1972:331-2) points out, "there was no reason to expect the tension between family life and other institutions of modern society to increase in the 1960's... While one would not expect family life ever to change completely to resemble the impersonal bureaucratic world of work, one might expect families, especially successful middle-class families, to better prepare their children to make the adjustment." Furthermore, there is "no reason to expect the problems of adolescence to be significantly more severe in one decade than in the next." Goertzel concludes, "the structural-functional approach may be useful in explaining the functions of social clubs or gangs among young people, but it is of limited value in explaining the type of radical youth movements which became significant in the 1960's."[8]

Furthermore, it must be noted that the revolt of American youth in the 1960's did not reflect resentment over being denied acceptance or participation in the larger society. On the contrary, Keniston (1972:23) observes, "far from seeking the adult prerogatives of their parents, most youths vehemently demand a virtual indefinite prolongation of their non-adult state." The contemporary youth movement, Howard (1974) states, has been characterized by lateral rather than vertical deviance. Youth have not been tempted to enjoy the forbidden pleasures and privileges of adults so much as they have have developed their own pleasures distinct from and sometimes competetive with those of adults.

The fundamental inadequancy of the Parsons-Platt explanation of youth protest, is that, like the family socialization model, it is ahistorical. Focused so much on the problem of order, it is never able to deal adequately with the problem of change. Parsons and Platt are never able to explain why the scope and intensity of student protest increased dramatically in the latter half of the sixties over the earlier half. Gusfield (1974:294) points out the real history of campus protest would contradict Parsons' and Platts' "socialization thesis." He says, "the tensions of socialization through higher education probably fall more heavily on the commuting and mobile student in the nonelite institutions, where unrest was minimal, than on the elite student. The latter has much less fear for his economic and occupational future and is, correspondingly, freer to act out his protest." Even as an ad hoc explanation for current events its predictive power is seriously limited.[9] The important events of the period are largely ignored. Gusfield (1974:293) states, "the thesis that the tensions of socialization underlie the discontents and unrest is mostly gratuitious...The political aspects of the Vietnam War and of the Civil Rights Movement are scanted as triggering mechanisms."

In the final analysis, the structural-functional approach sheds little light on the nature and dynamics of youth protest. Its primary advantage over the family socialization model resides in its emphasis on the importance of structural factors broader than family relations, but its insistence on restricting its interpretation to the "functional requirements" of social systems renders it useless as an explanation of youth protest in America in the 1960's.

MANNHEIM'S APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF GENERATIONS

There is an approach to youth protest movements which avoids the weaknesses of the family socialization and structural-functional approaches and places the problem in full structural and historical context: Mannheim's solution to the problem of political generations, a specification of his theory of the sociology of knowledge.

According to Mannheim (1972) generations may be defined as birth cohorts: persons occupying a common location in the "historical dimension of the social process." The biological succession of generations constitutes a constant dynamic factor in the production of social change. Old age groups die, carrying certain cultural practices with them, while new age groups emerge and experience a "fresh contact" with the accumulated culture-developing, selecting from it, and using it differently.

Mere contemporaneity does not, in itself, produce a common generation location. Mannheim (1972:113) states, "only where contemporaries definitely are in a position to participate as an integrated group in certain common experiences can we rightly speak of a community of location of a generation."[10]

Mannheim (1972:122) also distinguishes between generation location and generation as actuality. One may speak of a generation as actuality "only where a concrete bond is created between members of a generation by their being exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic

destablization." Members of an actualized generation "participate in a common destiny and in the ideas and concepts which are in some way bound up with its unfolding."

Mannheim (1972:119-120) further distinguishes between generation as actuality and generation-unit. He explains: "Youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation, while those groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways, constitute separate generation-units."

Any given actualized generation may contain several different generation-units within it. Members of the same generation-unit develop a collective identity by virtue of their parallel responses to social events. These responses are formulated within the context of concrete social groups which give expression to the "formative tendencies," "fundamental integrative attitudes," and "set of collective strivings" shared by members of the generation-unit.

Mannheim specifies the period between late adolescence and young adulthood (that stage of life now called "youth" and roughly encompassing the years 17 to 25) as the period in which socio-political identification with a generation-unit may occur for an individual. Until then, serious "questioning and reflecting on things" while personally experimenting with life usually is not possible. After then, these early impressions have already coalesced into a "natural view of the world" which influences the perception and limits the impact of all subsequent events. Mannheim labels this phenomenon the "stratification of consciousness."

Whether any segment of youth produces its own "distinctive unity of style" depends upon the "trigger action of the social and cultural process" (1972:126).

The more rapid the tempo of social change, the greater the probability that "particular generation location groups will react to changed situations by producing their own entelechy" (1972:125). During periods of relative social stability the younger generation tends to model itself after the older and greater cultural continuity is prevalent. During periods of more rapid social change, on the other hand, "the older generation becomes increasingly receptive to influences from the younger" (1972:117).

In Ideology and Utopia (1936) Mannheim explains that awareness of modifications in ways of thinking are not likely to occur in relatively static societies where adaptations to new problems extend gradually over several generations. When the pace of social change is speeded up, however, the probability of the self-conscious rationalization of cultural adaptations into a new style of thought is increased.

The ideologies which emerge from this process must be understood as a gestalt or "global impression" of the intellectual meaning of historical events. The gestalt derives from the influence of the group on the individual. It is the "formative and interpretative principles" inherent in the collectivity which provide the "form and context" for the new impulses, impressions, and experiences of spatially separated but similarly "located" individuals in the society.

According to Mannheim, each new actualized generation develops its own particular interpretation of the more comprehensive and historically persistent ideologies (i.e., liberalism, conservatism, socialism, etc.). The former are called generation-entelechies, the latter trend-entelechies. In any period of change one can find different generation-units, representing different ideological traditions, in conflict with each other. Intellectual coherence is maintained bacause these conflicting ideolgies are oriented to each other and represent "different attempts to master the same destiny and solve the same

social and intellectual problems that go with it" (1972:130).

What Mannheim calls the Zeitgeist of any historical epoch, the mentality or spirit of the age, represents the "outcome of the dynamic interaction of actual generations succeeding one another in a continuous series" (1972:130). Mannheim (1972:133-4) states, this wave-like rhythm in the change of the Zeitgeist is merely due to the fact that--according to the prevailing conditions--now one, and then the other pole succeeds in rallying an active youth which, then, carries the 'intermediary' generations and in particular the socially unattached individuals along." In Ideology and Utopia Mannheim (1936:270) joins this idea with his dialectical approach to the history of ideas:

> From the knowledge derived from our studies on competition and generations, we have concluded that, what, from the point of view of immanent intellectual history, appears to be the 'inner dialectic' in the development of ideas, becomes, from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge, the rhythmic movement in the history of ideas as affected by competition and the succession of generations.

According to Mannheim, it is the intelligentsia (the only group which Mannheim maintains is "socially unattached" and whose members thus are able to vacilate from one trend to another) who produce the cultural materials which interpret the dominant trend of the time.[11] Individuals other than professional intellectuals are molded by the intellectual influences indigenuous to their particular social aggregate. The aggregates are located within different racial, ethno-religious, and socioeconomic status heirarchies. Among other things, the ideologies of such aggregates represent rationalizations of their social, economic and political interests. The individual is attracted to these ideas because they "afford the typical chances of his life situation their most adequate expression" (1972:132).

Mannheim states that the origin of the social dynamic triggering the emergence of a new generation style is a question separate from the one he is examining in the problem of generations. He does make it clear, however, that the ideological style chosen by the intellectual strata to characterize a particular historical period is likely to reflect the changing fortunes of the different social strata during a period of social change. Mannheim (1972:129) states: "The mentality which is commonly attributed to an epoch has its proper seat in one (homogeneous or heterogeneous) social group which acquires special significance at a particular time, and is thus able to put its own intellectual stamp on all the other groups without either destroying or absorbing them." By way of illustration, Mannheim (1972:133) applies this principle to the analysis of a particular period in Western history:

> The period of the restoration and the social and political weaknesses of the German bourgeoisie at the beginning of the nineteenth century favored the development of entelechies at the romantic-conservative pole of the younger generation, which also attracted a large part of the socially unattached literati. From the thirties on, the July Revolution and the growing industrialization of the country favored the development of new liberal rationalist entelechies among the younger generation; and many of the literati promptly joined this camp.

In the above passage Mannheim links liberal-rationalist ideology with the bourgeoisie and romantic-conservative ideology with the landed aristocracy. He contends that historical events (i.e., the July Revolution) and the dominant socio-economic trend (i.e., industrialization) influenced the relative fortunes of these competing social groups. Finally, the ascendent group attracted many men of letters who idealized its world view as representative of the spirit of

the age and produced interpretations of its ideology in order to clarify the dominant trends of the time and stamp the period with its own particular intellectual style. This, in essence, represents Mannheim's theory of political generations which can be subsumed under his larger theory of the sociology of knowledge.

As can be seen, unlike the family socialization model, Mannheim's theory doesn't emphasize childhood socialization in analyzing youthful ideology or activism. On the contrary, his discussion of the development of socio-political orientations recognizes the stage specific nature of such social learning.

Moreover, Mannheim's theory does not distort the complex dynamics of age group relations in modern society by utilizing a lineage conception. Rather, it defines generations as birth cohorts who establish an age based bond by virtue of their common exposure to rapidly changing social conditions. In fact, both lineage conflict and political disagreement can be interpreted within Mannheim's framework as specific effects of a larger cause. As Riley, et al. (1972: vol. 2, 541-2) have pointed out, Mannheim recognized that, although "responsibility for socialization may be in the hands of the socializing agent," in practice, "much reciprocal socialization occurs regardless of socially defined responsibilities."

Unlike the structual-functional model, Mannheim's theory does not view youth protest as a reaction against their extended socialization and exclusion from direct participation in the economic and political life of the society. On the contrary, Mannheim is inclined to see this hiatus as providing young people with a unique opportunity to achieve greater awareness of themselves and their environment; an awareness which will mark their political orientation through the life cycle. Mannheim's focus is on youths' responses to the larger historical problems and contradictions in the social order. Consequently, he allows for the

continuation of ideological commitment among members of generation-units even after achieving the transition to adult status.

Mannheim's theory is not restricted by a teleology which postulates increasing social integration and declining protest activity in advanced industrial societies. Rather it remains sensitive to the different effects of historical events and changing social conditions. Finally, it doesn't assume that youth protest is simply rebellion against adult authority and, thereby, dysfunctional for maintaining the stability of a progressive social order, a view which contains an implicit value bias (c.f. Hughes, 1971:55). On the contrary, Mannheim suggests that youth protest may advance new forms of consciousness with the potential to generate a movement toward the reconstruction of the prevailing society into a more utopian image (see the research on generational support for the Cuban Revolution by Zeitlin, 1966, for such an example).

In the last anlaysis, Mannheim seeks to comprehend the relationship between social structural changes, historical events, and the Zeitgeist or spirit of the historical period related to such change, in terms of the activity of youth based generations-units with a particular location in social time and space.

RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON PROTEST AND PROTESTORS

Three important bodies of empirical research which have emerged over the past decade have inferences which clearly support Mannheim's approach to youth protest over that of the family socialization and structural-functional approaches. First, studies of activitists over the period of the middle sixties and into the early seventies show that both New Left and Counterculture ideologies came in time to transcend their original social location and to attract adherents from widely different family backgrounds (see Gallup, 1969; Dunlap, 1970; Smith, 1970; Meier and Orzen, 1971; Brown, 1973; and Langman, Block and Cunningham, 1973). In fact, as the movement expanded and diversified,

Mankoff and Flacks (1972:59) concluded from their research that family socialization "no longer serves as an adequate guide to understanding" radicalism; that the university had become the primary agent of political socialization.

As the movement crested over the years 1969-1973, the counterculture spread rapidly to rising numbers of non-college youth despite differences in family background, social location, and social psychological development. In 1969, according to the Yankelovich survey, only 42 percent of college youth agreed that "belonging to some organized religion is important in a person's life," as compared to 81 percent of their parents, 82 percent of non-college youth, and 91 percent of non-college youth parents. Over the next four years, the proportion claiming religion as a "very important personal value" declined by 28 percent among college youth and 36 percent among non-college youth.

The research on premarital sexual behavior indicated a decisive liberalization of norms occurring over the latter half of the decade of the sixties on. All of the evidence indicates that youth in the 1960's began engaging in premarital sexual intercourse starting at younger ages, more often, and with less guilt or fear of social consequences than ever before (See Cannon and Long, 1971; Leidy and Stary, 1967; Bell and Chaskes, 1970; and Christensen and Gregg, 1970). In 1969, according to Yankelovich, 34 percent of college youth agreed that "pre-marital sexual relations are morally wrong," as compared to 74 percent of their parents, 58 percent of non-college youth, and 88 percent of non-college youth parents. By 1973, those agreeing that premarital sex was wrong declined further to 22 percent among college youth and to 34 percent among non-college youth. Yankelovich also found substantial increases between 1969 and 1973 in those welcoming social changes leading to more acceptance of sexual freedom, from 43 percent to 61 percent among college youth and from 22 percent to 47 percent among non-college youth.

In addition to the above trends, Yankelovich reports increasing proportions of both college and non-college youth approving of extramarital and gay sex and disapproving of large families. Erosion of the "double standard" through liberalization of the norms regarding premarital sexuality, questioning of the norms regarding marriage, and the decline in approval of large families all constituted themes in the Women's Liberation movement which arose in the mid-1960's and gained strength through the 1970's.

Among those women's liberation arguments generating at least majority support in 1973 were the following: "Women should receive equal pay with men for equal work" (95 percent of college youth, 91 percent of non-college youth); "Women should be as free as men to take the initiative in sex relations" (84 percent college, 70 percent non-college); "Men and women are born with the same human nature; it's only the way they are brought up that makes them different" (57 percent college, 56 percent non-college); "The idea that women are more emotional and less logical than men is ridiculous" (53 percent college, 49 percent non-college); and "The relationship of a woman to other women is just as important as a woman's relationship to men" (64 percent college, 47 percent non-college).

The Yankelovich poll also reveals a large minority of youth contemplating what have come to be known as "alternative life styles." While about three of five of both college and non-college youth expressed the feeling that they would have "no difficulty in accepting the kind of life society has to offer," only about one in ten wanted the "same kind of life as my parents." Some 30 percent of college youth and 23 percent of non-college youth expressed interest in "living in a commune" and 49 percent of college youth and 41 percent of non-college youth expressed interest in living in a rural agricultural community. While the vast

majority of these were looking for a "short term" rather than "permanent" commitment, it is clear that a great many shared the desire for a less bureaucratically organized and more personally involving social experience.

As with the church and family, support for other major institutions declined dramatically as the movement spread. Between 1969 and 1973 the proportion of college students who felt that U.S. political parties were in need of "fundamental reform or elimination" rose from 57 percent to 61 percent. Among non-college youth the increase was even greater, from 44 percent to 64 percent. Between 1969 and 1973 opposition to big business increased both for college youth (from 37 percent to 54 percent) and non-college youth (from 24 percent to 45 percent). By 1973, 94 percent of college youth and 92 percent of non-college youth agreed that "business is too concerned with profits and not enough with public responsibility."

Consistent with this rising distrust of business was a loss of respect for those values associated with the traditional work ethic in American culture. For example, in 1969, only 56 percent of college youth agreed that "hard work will always pay off," as opposed to 76 percent of their parents, 79 percent of non-college youth, and 85 percent of parents of non-college youth. Those believing in the value of hard work fell to 44 percent among college youth and 56 percent among non-college youth by 1973.

By 1969, 72 percent of college youth agreed that "competition encourages excellence," as opposed to 84 percent of their parents, 92 percent of non-college youth, and 91 percent of non-college youth parents. Those believing in the value of competition fell to 62 percent among college youth and 66 percent among non-college youth by 1973. By 1973, only 20 percent of college youth and 34 percent of non-college youth attached "great importance" to money. Also, four-fifths of college youth and three-fourths of non-college youth welcomed "less emphasis" on money in American culture.

The erosion of legitimacy suffered by American society's principal institutions was expressed also in the increasing opposition to authority generally. Between 1969 and 1973, those "easily accepting" the "power and authority of the police" held at 48 percent among college youth and dropped from 79 percent to 60 percent among non-college youth; those easily accepting the "power and authority of the 'boss' in a work situation" dropped from 49 percent to 41 percent among college youth and from 71 percent to 57 percent among non-college youth; those easily accepting "conformity in matters of dress and personal grooming" held at 33 percent among college youth and dropped from 54 percent to 42 percent among non-college youth; and those easily accepting "abiding by laws you do not agree with" fell from 15 percent to 12 percent among college youth and from 34 percent to 24 percent among non-college youth. Only with respect to the minority who could easily accept "outward conformity for the sake of career or job advancement" was there any increase, from 14 percent to 20 percent for college youth and from 35 percent to 37 percent for non-college youth. In this context, I may note Gallup reported in 1974 that long hair continued to increase in popularity among youth between 1971 and 1974 when three of four young men preferred it.

The most visible aspect of youthful politics in the sixties was their anti-militarism, particularly their opposition to the Vietnam war. By 1973, only 19 percent of college youth and 40 percent of non-college youth attached "great importance" to patriotism. Between 1968 and 1973, while the war in Indochina wore on, the proportion of college youth who would agree that any of seven values presented by Yankelovich were "worth fighting a war for" shrank from a range of 20 percent to 64 percent (mean, 42 percent) to a range of 11 percent to 50 percent (mean, 29 percent). Among non-college youth the drop was from a range of 28 percent to 69 percent (mean, 56 percent) to a range of 23 percent to 53 percent (mean, 43 percent).

In 1971, 72 percent of students surveyed strongly or partially agreed that "the war in Vietnam is pure imperialism." In contemplating the end of the war in 1973, only a small minority (9 percent of college youth and 15 percent of non-college youth) thought "we ended the war with honor." A slightly smaller minority thought "we lost the war--the Communists will take over South Vietnam." Most felt either that "we waited too long/could have gotten same results earlier" (45 percent college and 43 percent non-college) or "we suffered a moral loss--we had no right to be there" (34 percent college and 32 percent non-college). Strikingly, about four of five in both groups thought that a "similar military involvement is unavoidable" in the future. Nevertheless, by 1973, 81 percent of college youth and 75 percent of non-college youth were in favor of "cutting back defense spending and using the money for domestic needs."

The second body of evidence which contradicts the family socialization and structural functional approaches to youth protest and supports the Mannheimian approach are the numerous trend studies of public opinion polls over the period in question demonstrating a diffusion to other age groups of more radical political and cultural orientations.

More favorable attitudes toward premarital sex, one important feature of the counterculture, certainly have spread to other age groups in the population. The proportion stating premarital sex is not wrong increased from 23 percent in 1969, to 51 percent in 1972, to 59 percent in 1978. The figures indicate that all age groups manifested significant period effects in this area, with the youngest age cohort leading the way. Approval of "schools giving courses in sex education" increased from 67 percent in 1951, to 71 percent in 1969, to 77 percent in 1977 (See Public Opinion, 1978b:36). Also, support for large families among the general public fell dramatically from a high of 49 percent in 1945, to 41 percent in 1968, down to 23 percent in 1971. By 1977, only 13 percent

of those polled considered four or more children an ideal size for a family (Gallup, 1977).

There has been a parallel rise in support among the general public for the rights of women. The Gallup poll shows that the proportion approving of "a married woman earning money in business or industry" even "if she has a husband capable of supporting her" increased from 24 percent in 1945, to 60 percent in 1970, to 72 percent in 1978. Also, the proportion willing to vote for a "qualified" woman for President of the United States increased from 54 percent in 1955, to 59 percent in 1967, to 66 percent in 1971, to 81 percent in 1978.

Another popular feature of the youth counterculture, the use of marijuana, also has spread to other age groups. A 1977 HEW report estimated that 36 million have tried marijuana and 15 million smoke it regularly. A Gallup (1977) poll the same year reported that the percentage of adults saying they had tried marijuana has risen from 4 percent in 1969, to 12 percent in 1973, to 24 percent in 1977. Correspondingly, the proportion who think marijuana should be made legal has increased from 13 percent in 1969 to 31 percent in 1978.

In his highly regarded history of the student movement, Altbach (1974) established that the three central issues of the New Left in the beginning of the sixties were civil liberties, civil rights, and peace, in that order. The years since activism on those issues have shown enormous shifts in public opinion.

A replication of Stouffer's 1954 study of civil liberties by the National Opinion Research Center in 1974 found the following: the proportion who would allow "somebody who is against all churches and religion" (i.e., an atheist) to "make a speech in your community" increased from 37 percent to 62 percent; the proportion who would allow a book which is "against churches and religion" to be kept in "your public library" increased from 35 percent to 59 percent; the

proportion would allow a person "favoring government ownership of all the railroads and big industries" (i.e,., a socialist) to "make a speech in your community" increased from 59 percent to 76 percent; the proportion who would allow "such a person" to "teach in a college or university" increased from 33 percent to 57 percent; and the proportion who would allow a book "favoring government ownership" to be kept in "your public library" increased from 53 percent to 69 percent. Public Opinion magazine (1978b:37) considers this to be dramatic growth in support for civil liberties.

A 1978 replication by the CBS News/New York Times polling group of the 1968 survey of the racial attitudes of blacks and whites by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the "Kerner Commission") found the following: the proportion of whites upholding the right of blacks to "live wherever they can afford to" over that of whites to "keep blacks out of their neighborhoods" increased from 63 percent to 93 percent; the proportion of whites who attributed the inferior jobs, education, and housing of black people to "something about blacks themselves" rather than to discrimination fell from 56 percent to 42 percent (13 percent said "both" and 17 percent had "no opinion"). Also, both blacks and whites perceived less "dislike" between the races in 1978, even though there were clear differences in the proportion saying "there's been a lot of progress in getting rid of racial discrimination" in the last 10 or 15 years (70 percent of whites and 47 percent of blacks, the latter down from 65 percent in 1968). (See Public Opinion 1978a:36).

The Gallup poll also provides evidence for a more liberal racial climate today. The proportion willing to vote for a "qualified Negro/black for President increased from 42 percent in 1958, to 74 percent in 1969, to 84 percent in 1978. The proportion disapproving of laws against marriages between Negroes/blacks and whites increased from 49 percent in 1965, to 62 percent in 1970,

to 72 percent in 1977. In 1963, 10 percent of white parents in the North and 65 percent of white parents in the South objected to sending their children to school where there were a few black students. By 1975, these proportions had declined to 3 percent in the North and 15 percent in the South. Over this same period the proportion objecting to their children going to schools that were half black fell from 33 percent to 24 percent in the North and from 78 percent to 38 percent in the South. Even the proportion objecting to sending their children to schools were blacks were in a clear majority dropped from 53 percent to 47 percent in the North and from 86 percent to 61 percent in the South (Delaney, 1975). In assesing these various changes, Public Opinion magazine (1978a) sees "several racial barriers disappearing."

Attitudes toward American foreign policy, including questions of war and peace, are notoriously unreliable and present a confusing instability in recent years (Starr, 1978). Nevertheless, in general, it is clear that isolationist and imperialist sentiments have diminished significantly and there is a solid majority in support of detente with both the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China, including new arms control agreements. In fact, by 1971, Gallup was able to report for the first time a larger proportion of the public in favor of admitting Communist China to the United Nations (45 percent) than opposed (38 percent). In 1961 only 20 percent supported admission. Similar results were obtained in the Harris Poll where the proportion in favor of Red Chinese admission rose from 10 percent in 1964 to 48 percent in 1971.

Looking back on their twelve years of war in Vietnam, Americans in 1979 were highly critical. Just 20 percent maintain that U.S. involvement was right; 64 percent now believe it was wrong ("More Sympathy for Vietnam":1979). In 1972, involuntary conscription was abolished and a professional army established. When polled by Gallup in 1977 as to whether, in view of current manpower problems in the armed forces, we should return to the draft, only 36 percent said yes.

Perhaps the most significant impact of the Movement of the 1960's has been to undermine public confidence in the nation's dominant institutions, especially the federal government. The pollster Louis Harris has found much evidence for a diminishing confidence in the American polity. By the end of 1971, he found 59 percent to 81 percent of his national sample agreeing with statements that, although initially motivated by a desire to serve others, most politicians make false promises, are not appointed on the basis of merit, are in politics to make money for themselves, and take graft. Harris found that the margin of public distrust increased from 12 percent to 16 percent on these various questions between 1967 and 1971 and that 35 percent felt that politics was more corrupt at the end of 1971 than it was ten years earlier, while only 8 percent felt it less corrupt.

Surveys by the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan (ISR) found that the proportion agreeing that the government wastes a lot of tax money has increased from 46 percent in 1958, to 61 percent in 1968, to 80 percent in 1978; the proportion agreeing that "you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right" "always" or "most of the time" has fallen from 75 percent in 1958, to 63 percent in 1968, to 34 percent in 1976; and the proportion stating that "the government in Washington is getting too powerful for the good of the country and the individual person" has increased from 44 percent in 1966, to 55 percent in 1968, to 69 percent in 1976.

The rising sense of alienation from the state also is reflected in the Harris surveys over the years. The proportion agreeing that the "people running the country don't really care what happens to you" has increased from 26 percent in 1966, to 50 percent in 1972, to 60 percent in 1977; the proportion feeling what they think "doesn't count much any more" has risen from 37 percent in 1966, to 53 percent in 1972, to 61 percent in 1977; even the proportion feeling "left out of things" around them has increased from 9 percent in 1966, to 25 percent in 1972, to 35 percent in 1977. Those agreeing that "the rich get richer and the poor

get poorer" has increased from 45 percent in 1966, to 68 percent in 1972, to 77 percent in 1977 (see Public Opinion, 1978a).

In analyzing the trend line in response to the ISR questions on "political trust, Lipset and Schneider (1978:43) observe, "distrust changed relatively little between 1958 and 1964, but in the succeeding six years--years of intense political controversy and polarization--there was a steep upward rise. Since 1970, distrust has continued at relatively high levels and in one instance--the number who think that 'quite a few' public officials are crooked--the level shot upwards even farther in the early 1970's, presumably in response to Watergate."

Moreover, this loss of confidence has affected every major institution, including medicine, the press, organized religion, the military, the U.S. Supreme Court, the executive branch of the federal government, Congress, labor unions, and major companies. Between 1966 and 1971 the average percentage expressing "a great deal of confidence" in leaders of the above nine institutions fell from 46 percent to just 27 percent; where it has remained, give or take six or seven points, throughout the 1970's.

Certainly public confidence in big business has plummeted since the crest of the movement. Between 1967 and 1977 "the percentage of the public claiming to have 'a favorable impression' of the 'oil and gasoline' industry fell by 40 points, of the 'food and food products' industry by 31 points, and of the automobile industry by 30 points...Not a single industry out of twenty-five and not a single corporation out of fifty acutally improved its public reputation between the late 1960's and the late 1970's." Of particular relevance to our analysis is the fact that "the largest drop of confidence in business occurred between 1966 and 1971--before the 1974 recession." Moreover, liberal criticism of business, which in the past focused on its economic conservatism, has come to include its reactionary social values as well. In the view of post-movement liberals "business is now

guilty of an infinite number of social sins: the multinational corporation has become a threat to the world economy, business now fuels the military-industrial complex, business has become enmeshed in political corruption, business seeks economic growth at any social cost, including pollution and destruction of the environment, and so on". (Lipset and Schneider, 1978:47)

In the wholesale condemnation of government, business, and the unions, Lipset and Schneider perceive a core sentiment against "bigness"--that is, "that the concentration of power in the hands of the self-interested is inherently dangerous and untrustworthy." It seems quite clear from all the evidence that the early New Left and counterculture critique of American society has become the dominant belief system in the seventies. I must concur with the evaluation of Lipset and Schneider (1978:46) on the question: "The Vietnam involvement, the explosion of antiwar protest, and the rise of militant social movements concerned with the status of various minority groups--blacks, Hispanics, and particularly a nonminority group, women-seemingly changed the perception which Americans had of their country."

A final body of evidence which confirms the validity of the Mannheimian approach to youth protest over the family socialization and structural functional approaches are the numerous follow-up studies of activists which document the persistence of radical political and cultural orientations five and ten years later; past the youth stage and into young adulthood.

One important study of this question is Fendrich's (1974) ten year follow-up of Florida State University students enrolled during the period 1960-64. One group of fifty male students selected consisted of former civil rights activists, another fifty of randomly selected former student government members, and another fifty of randomly selected undergraduates. Almost two-thirds of all questionnaires were returned, with no significant differences in the response rates for the three groups.

Fendrich's analysis reveals the former civil rights activists to be still significantly more radical in both life style and politics than their former classmates. While 78% of the activists now consider themselves radical or liberal, this is true for only 10% of the student government members and 15% of the regular students. Civil rights activists are also likely to be more active in both conventional two-party and radical confrontation politics than the other groups. They are also less likely to be married or to have children if they are married. Fendrich (1974) concludes:

> In sum, the activists have not been co-opted during the ten years since they became involved in civil rights protests. Nor have they allowed themselves to drift into a retreatist life-style. Instead they have combined ideological commitments with the typical societal pressures of making a living...The actions activists took in college are still related to their life-style today. A distinctive generational unit was formed out of their protest and it will continue to affect the course of political decision-making in the United States.

Other studies of generation-units corroborate these findings. A study of forty white students who had participated in a summer civil rights project sponsored by SCLC in 1965, showed that, four years later, all the participants still considered themselves either liberal or radical and had retained an emotional involvement in the movement (Demerath, Marwell and Aiken, 1971). Greenes' (1970) five year follow-up of twelve former Free Speech Movement activists found that all had retained a radical ideology and about two-thirds were still active in leftist causes.

Meyer and Maidenberg (1970) also conducted a five year follow-up study of Berkeley students, surveying all those who had been arresed in the Sproul Hall

sit-in. About half the group, some 230, responded. Those surveyed still characterized their political beliefs as consistent with those held immediately after the arrests and somewhat more radical than before the FSM. Actual participation in radical political activities had declined, however. Finally, Nassi and Abramowitz (1978) conducted an in-depth analysis of fifteen of 13[illegible] FSM arrestees eleven years later. After numerous methodological caveats (large sample loss and small sample size, questionable representativeness of FSM for radical movement, the absence of a control group, the possibility of statistical artifacts, like regression to the mean) and numerous findings which suggest a "striking reduction in political activity," "somewhat less radical ideology," and more conventional view of self, the authors (p.2) conclude that nevertheless, "certain lasting characteristics of this group of students activists as a generational unit appear to be distinct."

> Foremost among those defining features are (a) the relative durability of the leftist political philosophy of the Sixties; (b) the choice of occupation guided by political considerations in addition to conventional reward and status structures; and (c) the continuing struggle with the dilemma of maintaining moral integrity in a world that reinforces pragmatic self-interest.

Findings such as the above obviously advance Mannheim's approach over that of the family socialization and structural-functional approaches which interpreted youth protest as the symbolic expression of the experiences or strains peculiar to the background or social location of the protestors.

RESEARCH ON GENERATIONS

Numerous studies of problems in generational theory have and are being conducted by leading scholars. Elkin and McKitrick (1961) have applied generational analysis to the study of the Federalist/Anti-Federalist split among our "founding

fathers." After exhausting more conventional approaches to the problem, the authors conclude that, generational differences were the decisive factor in accounting for attitudes toward the centralization of the state. Elkin and McKitrick (1961:201) state: "a significant proportion of relative newcomers with prospects initially modest, happened to have their careers opened up at a time and in such a way that their public personalities came to be staked upon the national quality of the experience which formed them."

Another important study in this mode, Maurice Zeitlin's (1966) study of "Political Generations in the Cuban Working Class," Found that "the specific historical period in which successive generations of workers first became involved in the labor movement had significant consequences for the formation of their political outlook."

One of the most ambitious studies of generational ideology to date is Robert Putnam's (1973) The Beliefs of Politicians, based on interviews with samples of British and Italian politicians. When Putnam uncovers differences in the extent of ideological political thinking according to national culture and age group, he seeks the explanation in the socio-economic history of the two countries over the past half century, invoking Mannheim's paradigm of political generations for his analysis. Putnam recognizes the complexity of disentangling "life cycle," "natural selection" (changing compositional), and "generational" explanations of data gathered at one point in time. He organizes the data according to age group, treating the latter as generational cohorts in order to chart historical changes. Following this procedure, Putnam finds significant differences in ideological content according to generation.

There also is a major study by Glen Elder (1974) which examines the continuing impact of the Great Depression on the lives of youth of the period decades later. There is currently a major study by Bengtson and his associates of three generation

families which will provide data on continuity and discontinuity across age-groups, generational solidarity and the persistence of generational themes over time, as well as data on the relationship between generations and other dimenisons of social structure. The illuminating three lineage family studies of Reubin Hill and Joan Aldous (1970), Alfred Fengler and Vivian Wood (1972) also must be mentioned in this context. There also is a large study of communes by Zablocki and his colleagues which promises to provide extensive data on the characteristics of that generation unit and its prospects for survival over time. In addition, this study should provide data to further clarify the concept of generation units.

There also are a number of recently published studies on the psychosocial dynamics of status passage through the life course (see Block, 1971; Gould, 1978; Heath, 1968; Kagan and Moss, 1962; Lowenthal, Thurnler and Chiriboga, 1975; Levinson et.al., 1978; Maas and Kuypers, 1975; and Valliant, 1977). Many other such studies currently are planned, including a follow-up by Starr of Peace Corps Volunteers studied during the crucial years 1966-1968, which will adopt a phenomenology of aging approach to focus on such issues as the interaction of generational identity with changing age group interests and the strategies of accounting for one's sense of self over the life course.

TOWARD A GENERATIONAL APPROACH TO YOUTH PROTEST

Because of their cognitive maturity, their lack of conventional role commitments, their energy, mobility and psychology versatility, youth typically are the most numerous age group represented in any social movement. What distinguishes youth movements from other types is that age group is the primary (although not always exclusive) criteria for identifying who is involved and on what side. The essential issue, to use Lofland's language, is which pivotal categories (male/female, black/white, young/old, rich/poor, etc.) became the principal basis for identification and affiliation. In the sixties it was young versus old.

The task for generational analysis, in the words of Philip Abrams (1970) is to "ask in what circumstances differentiation springing from the social organization of age will crop into age-linked political conflict, and finally we must ask in what particular circumstances such conflicts will be defined in terms of a conflict of generations rather than anything else." Mannheim poses this question more in terms of historical process than social structure, but the essential concern is the same. He says, "It is a matter for historical and social research to discover at what stage in its development, and under what conditions, a class becomes class-conscious, and similarly, when individual members of a generation become conscious of their common situation and make this consciousness the basis of their group solidarity."

Of course, Mannheim did not claim that youth were the original source of cultural or political innovation. They are more correctly seen as the vehicle within a complex society through which new postures are introduced into the culture. As Lambert (1972) puts it, "Whoever produces an innovation, the young import it into social history." This identifies youth as having a unique historical role and social function. Horowitz and Friedland (1970) state:

> The implications of considering students as a class are varied. It emphasizes their historical importance. This is crucial in a dynamic society that must rely for rejuvenization on the political mobilization and moral fervor of its youth. The structural location of a group makes possible the rational restructuring of society to reduce strains and to redirect wasted energy. It further points out the need for an institutional response on the part of adult society as well as an institutionalized mode of participation for the young. (italics mine)

A recent paper by Yoels and Karp (1976) elaborates on the concept of generation in the context of a consideration of the basic sources of non-

conformity and change in social systems: "The development of different generational styles is an inevitable sociological phenomenon and one which insures the 'imperfectability' of the socialization process. Because new generations of persons have not themselves had a hand in the creation of the 'reality' which they are expected to appropriate as their 'own,' their experiencing of that reality is bound to differ from that of previous generations."

Yoels and Karp (1976) conclude that the "concept of generation...introduces another continual source of non-conformity and social change into pre-existent social arrangements." Likewise, Berger and Luckman (1966) state that the "new generation posits a problem of compliance, and its socialization into the institutional order requires the establishment of sanctions."

This analysis would suggest that youthful rebellion should be viewed more as the norm than the exception in modern society. Indeed, many contemporary observers have taken that position. Howowitz and Friedland (1970:) assert, "the most intensive conflict in contemporary industrial societies is not among religions, political parties, workers and management, or even races, but between youth and adults." In the opinion of the authors of the Scranton Commission report (1971) "it is not so much the unrest" of the late sixties "that is exceptional as it is the quiet of the twenty years which preceeded them." Lee (1970) observes:

> The ethos of each generation has evolved not only out of a reaction to the current issues but also out of a concern with conditions for the future, political or social. To designate student behavior simply as a problem of the 'generation gap' is to misunderstand grossly the role of youth. As Stephen Spender says, '...it would be better to speak not of the generation gap, but rather of an overlap of problems of the future with the day-

> to-day ones of the present...So the young generation is not so much a 'gap' as an overlapping of the future, burdened with problems which to the old seem abstract, but which are built into the flesh and blood of the young.'

Because of their "fresh contact," youth subject the taken-for-granted world to new questioning. Such questioning may lead to the definition of problems and the development of solutions. Because of their unique social location, "the young have become one of the very few social levers dissent has to work with. This is the 'significant soil' in which the Great Refusal has taken root" (Roszak, 1969) As the existing culture, in particular the ideology of Established interests, proves inadequate to the emerging problems of a rapidly changing social order, youth may rejuvenate that culture and generate a new order.

These comments underline the particular value of the concept of generations to the understanding of social conflict and social change. Because of its dialectical character, however, the concept of generations accounts very well for prolonged periods of social integration and harmony as well as change. Each new generation can shed obsolete knowledge and painful memories of past conflicts more easily than the last-to reconstitute a new sense of order as it were. To state such is to acknowledge simply that, in an open social system, change frequently is necessary to order.

An adequate understanding of youth movements requires theory, methods, and data which comprehend the historical nature of the subject and which are concerned primarily with the problem of social change, not social order. Mannheim's theory of generations, which awaits further development (see Starr, forthcoming), meets these essential criteria. Its compatibility with the established "facts" about the youth movement of the sixties mandates its

development and application to the question of youth protest and, in particular, the role of socio-political generations in historical change.

FOOTNOTES

1. Davis (1940) has long maintained that control in a primary group like the family can never be purely one-sided because there are many ways in which the subordinated can exert the pressure of his/her will. Bengtson and Black (1973) have pointed out that, while the older generation has the authority and responsibility to socialize youth, their influence is limited by the fact that they have a "developmental stake" in the younger generation to extend and justify their lives. This emotional investment provides youth with leverage to role bargain with their parents to negotiate new expectations. Among many possibilities, this leverage may be exploited in situations where youth remind parents of values they have held in the past or where more educated youth may provide parents with political information which is lacking (Foner, 1972).

2. Factors related to social class membership are so germane to the socialization of children that they may not even have to be mediated by any ideologically preferred course of childrearing by the parents. Minturn and Lambert (1968:291) state:

> It now appears that the pressures impinging upon the growing child are much more in the nature of byproducts of the horde of apparently irrelevant considerations that impinge upon the parents. These considerations of household composition, size of family, work load and the like, determine the time and energy that mothers have available to care for children. They determine the range and content in which the relations take place. The coerciveness of these forces becomes apparent in broad spectrum of cross-cultural comparison. Each mother must solve the problem of these worlds and pass on to her children both the problems and solutions. We think that the message that each passes to her children is more a function of the problems than of a theory of childrearing.

This view explains why empirical studies of the consequences of various child-rearing practices (e.g., manner of nursing, weaning, scheduling, bowel and bladder training, etc.) "have found very little or no relationship between these experiences and childhood personality traits and adjustment patterns" (Sewell, 1961:350). Finally, with respect to the issue at hand, Ann Foner (1974) reminds us that "both permissive and authoritarian upbringing are undoubtedly more pervasive than student activism" and "even when young people are motivated to rebel against their parents, their hostility need not be expressed in the political sphere."

3. Aberle and Naegle (1952) have reasoned that the inability of fathers to "guarantee a particular niche" to their sons reduces the extent to which they can anticipate and socialize them into particular skills, values, and personality traits. This situation also can be seen as having influenced parents to emphasize skills and orientations (e.g., popularity with peers) which are more likely to lead to material success in the job market despite the consequence of their reducing the personal impact of the parents on the child.

4. According to recent analyses this grand system of public schools for the masses can be said to have performed a variety of function: (1) warehousing surplus labor in order to limit adult unemployment and prevent labor discontent; (2) improving the bureaucratic discipline and skill training of labor; (3) accounting for and supervising the children of workers; (4) socializing workers' children into deference to the national elite culture; (5) structuring the opportunities for social mobility of some children of workers; and (6) legitimating social inequality. In addition to these political and economic factors, we also must note the special value attaches to formal education in Western culture.

The revolutionary expansion of higher education was due to the above factors and also because of (1) the periodic need of the political economy to dis-accumulate surplus capital in order to avoid depression while investing in the productive capacity of middle level workers; (2) the desire for graduate training and research centers to carry on industrial research with highly skilled, low wage laborers (graduate students); and (3) the increased status aspirations of a public enjoying greater affluence in a period of American world ascendency. By the end of the 1960's, the knowledge industry, of which the university is the center, had come to account for 30% of gross national product (see Katz, 1968; Spring, 1972; Carnoy, 1972; Greer, 1972).

5. It is worth noting that two well known critics of radical youth in the late 1960's and early 1970's, Bruno Bettelheim (1965) and Joseph Adelson, (1964), utilized essentially the same psychoanalytic paradigm and social observations in earlier essays to account for the aimlessness, conflict avoidance, conformity and privatism of youth in the 1950's and early 1960's. In both cases, the subsequent historical transformation clearly eluded the authors' clinical prognoses.

6. Moreover, it should be noted that the measure of generational differences has been noted to vary greatly according to whether it refers to lineage or cohort differences. John Conger (1971) reports that studies have shown that adolescents are more critical of the "older generation" as a whole than of their own parents and perceive their parents as being less critical of them than of their age cohorts in general. Bengtson (1971) has demonstrated rather conclusively that, regardless of generation (grandparent, parent, child), individuals perceive much less of a lineage than a cohort gap; recognize social distance between age groups in society, but claim that it is much smaller in their own family.

7. In a particularly scathing critique of Parsonian theory, Foss (1963:108) charges that "Parsons rarely if ever attributes political radicalism or political action movements to direct confrontations of interest within the social structure. Rather, the distressed groups have generally been sideswiped by the major processes of change going on autonomously around them." This is shown to be the case even for what Parsons calls the "so-called 'class conflicts' in modern western society." Even the considerably more restrained criticism of Bennett Berger (1971:279) finds Parsonian theory deficient in the same essential respect:

> Parsonian theory so sensitizes one to integration, order, and processes of self-regulation that conflict or other 'disturbances' in the equilibrium of social systems can barely be discussed in other than pathological terms. When Parsons gives his attention to the phenomena of disequilibrium, it is almost always with a clinical vocabulary and with one eye on the compensatory re-equilibrating forces that the system will bring to bear in order to restore 'balance'.

8. Indeed, Parsons has provided the theoretical basis for much work here, including the classic study of Delinquent Boys (1955) by A.K. Cohen. It is in the working class where we are most likely to find the institutional authorities upon which youth depend (teachers, parents, counselors, et.) most "out of tune" with the organization of the economic world. Research by Mauss and Winston (1971:9) has found "the most likely kind of youngster to be involved in a 'generation gap' [in terms of degree of identification with adult authority figures] would be a working-class, unchurched student with poor grades and low gratification deferral, or, in other words, one clearly not part of the 'establishment.'" Confrontations of such youth with adult authorities is better understood as rebellion, fostered by a sense of deprivation and rejection, rather than truly revolutionary action on behalf of an alternative conception of the good society.

9. According to the authors, once the new structural patterns are fully institutionalized, the resultant life cycle disturbances may be expected to subside. Parsons and Platt (1972:, p. 241) caution: "this does not imply that the oedipal, latency, or adolescent phases are no longer stressful, only that the tension has decreased, so that passing through these stages is more routinely accomplished." According to this logic, since student protests represent life stage reactions to as yet unstabilized new social patterns, like the life cycle disturbances of previous periods of structural differentiation, they should decrease in scope and intensity as the extended socialization and dependency resulting from prolonged education become more wide-spread and routine.

The Parsons-Platt emphasis on the structural determinants of life cycle stages can be found in the writings of many other social scientists (e.g., Benedict, 1938; Davis, 1940; Mead, 1958; Musgrove, 1965; Bakan, 1971). However, to my knowledge, no one has been able to document, let along measure, any decrease in the tensions related to passing through these stages. Parsons and Platt do not explain why the mere fact of the institutionalization of a new socialization pattern, regardless of the nature of such a pattern, necessarily should led to a decrease in its age related disturbances. In fact, if the rising number of suicides, run-aways, drug arrests, and protests among high school youth in the late 1960's and early 1970's constitutes any measure, the stress and strain of this stage seems to be increasing, despite the fact that completion of high school is now normative.

10. This condition rests on Mannheim's (1972:111) conviction that an individual only "really" possesses "memories" and "knowledge" personally acquired in real situations, as opposed to those which are "appropriated" from cultural representations of the experiences of others. Only the former has "real binding power." This position clearly reflects both the social realism of Marx

and the social behaviorism of pragmatism, both major influences on Mannheim's thought. In fact, Mannheim compares generational membership to social class membership, proposing that they both be considered social "locations" which exclude "a large number of possible modes of thought, experience, feeling and action" while encouraging others(1972, p. 196).

11. Mannheim (1972:135) adds that "certain forms of intercourse are more adequate to one particular set of social and generation trends than others." Accordingly, the formal complexity of various concrete groups, as well as the opportunity for innovation within various fields, would influence the liklihood of the emergence of generation entelechies.

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